

So, You Want to Start a Government?

Using Federalist #1 to explain why not all governments are successful

An Honors Thesis (POLS 404)

By

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ABSTRACT

In Federalist #1, Alexander Hamilton identifies two developmental pathways for governments. He asserts that governments arise from either “accident and force” or by “reflection and choice”. He then goes on to claim that good governments arise from “reflection and choice” rather than through “accident and force”. This study is an attempt to validate or refute that claim by using a variety of metrics and historical knowledge to run regressions to study the relationship between government development and government quality. We found that formation type is a statistically significant determinant of government quality. Other factors that impact quality are regime age, continent, and type of government.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Richard Boyd for taking on a project with a student from a different university hundreds of miles away from D.C. His mentorship and advice on this project were invaluable. Additional thanks to Dr. Darren Wheeler for helping manage the project and for allowing me to pursue a non-traditional thesis experience.

I would also like to thank my fiancé Michael for being my sounding board and biggest supporter throughout this project.

PROCESS ANALYSIS

Completing this thesis was a challenge that taught me a lot about myself and about research. Speaking first to the research experience, I learned how to comb through vast quantities of qualitative and quantitative information and data in an efficient manner. Completing a literature review over such a variety of political topics was very enlightening, and I feel like I understand many aspects of political theory in a much more concrete way.

Regarding data collection and analysis, I had the opportunity to use many of the skills pertaining to statistical analysis that I have learned in my political science and economics courses. It was extremely rewarding to have the opportunity to apply my learning to a real-world issue. It was simultaneously frustrating and exciting to have to trouble-shoot in Excel to get the best possible regressions and visualizations.

Writing the thesis came very easily. I put a lot of effort into developing an outline, so when it was time to write out my research and findings, I knew exactly what moves I needed to make at various points in the paper. I also had a lot of passion for telling the story my research revealed, which made the writing process engaging and fun.

From a personal perspective, I feel a much deeper appreciation for America. The media constantly talks about how terrible circumstances are in the US. Yet, compared to the rest of the world, the United States is a wonderful place to call home. I believe that my generation has lost sight of this perspective and is quick to want to simply start over. America is far from perfect, but it offers its citizens a much higher quality of life than other nations offer their citizens. This project opened my eyes to the true extent of the challenges facing many countries and has reaffirmed my desire to use my life to help other people understand their circumstances and to overcome their challenges.

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1980s, the world has been characterized by rapid regime change and international intervention. The collapse of the Soviet Union left a vacuum in Eastern Europe. The US and international, nongovernment organizations like The World Bank tried to instill leaders and institutions in South America to curb socialist expansion and create stability. In the Middle East, the United Nations, led by the United States, led both military and diplomatic efforts to contain violence, protect oil interests, and promote democracy. Perhaps most notably, President Bush declared a “War on Terror” following the 9/11 terrorist attacks carried out by al Qaeda forces. As part of this effort, the US military sought regime change in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran.

Yet, despite the best intentions of various actors in establishing new governments to replace the failed ones, failures continue to occur. Venezuela is in now in crisis, with thousands of its citizens seeking asylum throughout the Americas. The Middle East has been splintered into factions by US forces, terrorist organizations, and nationalist movements. One of the largest humanitarian crises in recent history, the Refugee Crisis, has seen millions of Syrian and Yemenis civilians displaced. These numerous examples of governments failing has left the world wondering, “What keeps going wrong and how can these failures be prevented in the future?”

The notion of government failure is not a new concept, and these most recent failures are not new to the human experience. One of the constants throughout history has been the rise and fall of nations. People have been puzzled for decades by the question, “Why do countries have such different outcomes in the quality of their government?” While many studies have attempted to answer that question, unexplained variation in government outcome still remains. Seeing these grey areas, we began to

wonder what other explanations could exist. Then we came across a claim made in “Federalist #1” by Alexander Hamilton regarding the relationship between development type and outcome. Hamilton writes,

“It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis, at which we are arrived, may with propriety be regarded as the area in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act, may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.”

The claim at the heart of Hamilton’s statement is the inspiration for this study. The immediate question this passage leaves its reader with is, “Did Hamilton have the right idea?” At least, we were left asking that question. So, we set out to design a study that could both evaluate the legitimacy of Hamilton’s claim and contribute to the fields of government development and international relations. By looking at whether a government developed through “accident and force” (A+F) or “choice and reflection” (C+R), we believe that is possible to uncover the relationship between development type, a few other key metrics, and the outcome associated with those inputs. This is a new approach to the issue of government development. While literature from myriad disciplines seeks to explain why some governments are successful and why others fail, none have looked at development through Hamilton’s lens. Looking to other studies, many disciplines have used their special brand of investigation to look at different aspects of government development. Economists have looked at the “resource curse” and economic structures; political scientists have investigated colonization, institutions,

and political culture; and health researchers have studied disease and the environment to explain the variation in government success and quality.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Looking first to economic and political explanations for variation in government outcomes, one primary explanation is rooted in the “resource curse” phenomenon. Many studies have attempted to determine why nations with an abundance of natural resources tend to experience more corruption, instability, and generally worse outcomes than countries without an abundance of natural resources [1,2,3,4,5,6]. While the notion of the “resource curse” is a widely accepted phenomenon, there are plenty of studies that either agree conditionally with the theory or reject it outright. Many studies have found that other factors related to the management of resources and the political culture of resource-wealthy countries are more determinative of outcomes than the simple presence of natural resources. In fact, many researchers believe it is the quality of government and the extent of its corruption that better predicts the quality of life within resource-rich nations than merely possessing limited resources [7,8,9,10]. However, despite disagreements, most experts concur that the relationship between government and the possession of natural resources impacts the quality of outcomes within a given country.

Another angle to look at when investigating the differences in outcomes between governments is the impact of colonization. Colonization can be broken into different components including the identity of the colonizer, institutions, the purpose of the colony, and political culture. By looking at the identity of the colonizer, institutional metrics and purposes are wrapped-up into one measure. Many of the studies in this area have found that colonies under British rule fared much better in the long run than

colonies held by France, Belgium, Spain, or Portugal [11,12,13,14,15,16]. These studies, which look at the identity of the colonizer as a whole, aggregate the nuanced components of colonization to reveal a broader theme. One such concept is that different countries choose colonies for different reasons, meaning that colonization is not random. For example, Britain sought colonies that would become footholds for the British Empire while Belgium sought colonies for resource exploitation. Due to these different motivations, colonizers treated their colonies differently and mixed cultures in different ways. Additionally, some countries retained authority over their colonies for a longer period of time, which is also a single factor believed to have an impact on post-colonial success of former colonies.

Another avenue of explanation looks how and why colonies were settled. Starting with the “how” component, social scientists have looked at mortality of soldiers to observe settlement patterns. The studies attribute post-colonization government success to low soldier mortality, because low mortality rates meant that initial settlements were more peaceful, had blended cultures, and adopted the institutions and laws of the colonizing country [17,18,9,20,21,22].

Turning to the “why” component, researchers also have found that the purpose and identity for the colonized country are thought to explain why the governments of some colonized countries turn out so much better than the governments of other colonized countries [23,24,25,26]. For example, a country like America, which was settled with the intent of starting a new branch of the British Empire, had the opportunity to synthesize old institutions with new ideas freely, while colonies like Haiti or South Africa were obtained to provide the colonizer with scarce natural resources, free labor, and captive markets. Said as a metaphor, if the two types of colonies were

children, the former was a child given the freedom to grow relatively freely while the later was a child under strict parental control and limited in behavior. The stunted growth of the later is thought to contribute to subsequent government failure post-colonization.

Additionally, using the variation in colonizer institutions as an explanatory variable has shown that colonies given property rights, voting power, or means for recourse tend to have better outcomes than colonies that are denied those institutions [27,28,29,30,31]. There is no question that, for countries who are colonized, the factors of colonization play an important role in determining the outcome of government in that country post-colonization.

A different vein of explanation regarding regime success or failure stems from studies surrounding political culture. Under this understanding, it is thought that governments succeed or fail due to the influence of culture within the country in question. These studies tend to find that the cultural and traditional norms of a country have a significant impact on government outcome [32,33,34,35,36]. While these studies tend to be more qualitative in nature, they draw compelling connections between culture and regime success. In general, countries with cultures that emphasize freedoms, liberties, and fun tend to have better outcomes than those that do not.

Turning now to public health explanations for why some governments succeed and some do not, the two primary explanatory factors that have been studied are disease and the environment. Investigations focused on the impact of disease have identified the connection between warm and wet environments with large mosquito populations and the high prevalence of diseases like Malaria and West Nile Virus. When laid out on a world map, countries fitting the environmental and disease criteria are mostly in Africa,

South Asia, and Central America. These are also the locations where countries tend to have the most political instability and worst quality of life.

Another relationship of focus for environmental studies is the connection between the environment and economic development. Countries and regions with significant geographic barriers that make it difficult for laborers to get to work, goods to be transported, or facilities to be built tend to have worse outcomes. Additionally, countries with an abundance of very scarce or valuable resources like diamonds, oil, and rubber also had worse outcomes because the people with control scarce resources also tend to be the people with political power. These individuals then use their concentrated power to limit the economic freedom of the citizens of the country in general to maintain control. An important piece to note about many of the studies focusing on health and environment is that they looked primarily at countries that had undergone colonization.

While all of these studies have made significant contributions to better understanding why variation in government outcomes occurs, a few problems still remain. First, many studies focus only on countries that had been colonized by Western European powers. This research design means that many countries and governments are not included in these studies. The fact that our study does not rely on colonization as a means of explaining the variance between country outcomes is one way that it diverges from previous investigations. Where many other studies have placed significance on whether or not a country was colonized, our investigation cares primarily about the transition from an old political model to the most recent version. For this reason, we are able to include all countries recognized by the United Nations in our analysis, regardless

of former colonization status. This allows us to develop a more complete picture government development by including more countries in our sample.

Another way this study is different its predecessors is that it is not tied to a specific time period. While other studies need a lot of historical information regarding colonization records, disease patterns, and economic trends to make their analysis viable, we are able to develop highly descriptive model using a code for development type and then using modern metrics to assess outcome. This not only makes our research much easier to update in future years, but it also makes it possible for our model to estimate the future relative success of a newly established regime. With the metrics used in this study, we can make reasonable predictions regarding a) the probability that a regime developed in a certain manner has of being successful, and b) how long it takes a regime that developed in a certain way to become good. Despite the benefits of a model that can use very current data, this model also has one shortcoming: it cannot predict the success of a country spanning the transition from one regime to the next. It cannot say that if the current or past government developed in a particular manner that the next government will have a given set of outcomes. Our study can only provide information about the current regime.

While the differences between our research and previous research are important, the most striking distinction of our study is its universal applicability and its impact on modern policy decisions. Having a way to simplify the many ways governments develop allows for our theory to be applied to virtually any country's government and to inform policy makers faced sensitive decisions. This feature is what makes our approach so relevant. As developed countries and international bodies seek to help or instigate regime change around the world, it would be helpful for relevant actors to have a sense

of what the consequences of their choices could be without having to take a wait-and-see approach. Old governments will continue to fail, and new governments will still be developed. This study is a way of using development context to explain why not all governments succeed. It is our hypothesis, inspired by Hamilton's claim, that countries that develop through "choice and reflection" will tend to have better governments as determined by outcomes within the country than countries that develop via "accident and force."

METHODS

This study investigates the governments of all countries recognized by the United Nations. We decided on this sample to ensure that we were using an acceptable list of all countries in the world and that there would be data available for our analysis. We chose to assess such a large sample to control for selection bias and error. The large sample size allowed for a representative sample of governments because it captured many government types, from all geographic regions, of various ages, and with many cultures. Because no two countries have identical internal workings and operations, it is important for these differences to be reflected in the data used in our analysis.

To determine how a government developed, we identified the year the current form of government was enacted. To do this, we found the most recent date that a constitution or other primary governing code was adopted. We then looked at the preceding 25 years of that country's and region's history. If a majority of events that occurred within that timespan included incidents like war, coup d'états, unsolicited external intervention, or other examples of force, then that government was considered to have developed from "accident and force" and coded as a 0. For example, Iraq was

coded as a 0 because there was little choice of the Iraqi people to adopt Iraq's current form of government.

Conversely, if a majority of events in the preceding 25 years included a constitutional convention, an open meeting of a previous government to establish a new government, free and public elections, or some other significant example of public deliberation, then the government was considered to have developed from "reflection and choice" and coded as a 1. As an example, the US was coded as a 1 because the 25 years preceding the adoption of the Constitution, captured the end of the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congresses, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitutional Convention. While war occurred, war is not what drove the adoption of the constitution; it was the failure of the Articles of Confederation, public demands, and the Constitutional Convention.

To investigate the history of each country, we first looked at the Britannica Encyclopedia and the CIA World Factbook. If those sources lacked information, gave conflicting accounts, or contained vague reports, we then utilized other sources to find the history of selected countries. These sources included archives from the BBC, PBS, various government archives and databases, news stories from global and national media, and academic publications about specific countries. The reason we focused on two sources initially was to standardize how much information was available for each country. Because all the countries included in this study are recognized by the United Nations, the two chosen sources had very consistent information for us to pull from.

Another variable we coded for was government type. Government type refers to categories like democracy, dictatorship, monarchy, and republic. Each type was assigned a numeric value. Appendix Two contains the code for government type. For all

countries included in this study, we were very careful to determine formation type prior to obtaining any quality metrics. This was done in an effort to keep information bias from skewing how countries were coded so that our analysis would reveal true relationships, not merely the relationship we hypothesized.

To determine whether or not a government was good or bad, we used a variety of measures about the population and institutions of the country under the assumption that a government that is doing well will provide its citizens with a high quality of life and positive outcomes. Because the goodness and badness of a government cannot be observed, we had to find measures that would be observable products of the goodness and badness of government. In identifying these products, we strove to remain as objective as possible and to recognize the potential pitfalls of taking this route. Because good and bad are subjective, using indicators that are universally acknowledged helped to avoid grey area. While we recognize there are imperfections with most metrics and the way they are calculated, the metrics we used are standardized so that all countries are subject to the same errors. In our analysis, we used metrics that fell into three main categories: economic, health, and civil well-being. We focused on these categories because a good government establishes the framework within which its citizens conduct high-quality lives. Through our research, we found that the quality of life could be captured by thinking about three categories mentioned previously. After obtaining the metrics within these categories, we generated crude and weighted quality scores for each country. These scores allowed us to rank our selected governments from best to worst and to identify where the split between good and bad governments lies. This allowed us to identify good and bad regimes through an ordinal rank determined by scale and ordinal variables rather than by other, more arbitrary, measures.

Once the data was compiled, we ran both single variate and multivariate regressions. The single variate regressions, coupled with ANOVA, R, and R-squared tests, were used to determine which outcomes of good or bad governance are most closely correlated with how a given government developed. A few multivariate regressions were then used to better evaluate the validity of Hamilton's claim and to retain or reject our hypothesis.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS


The first step we took to analyze our results was to look at descriptive statistics to better understand our data. Table 1 shows the percent of countries that arose from each formation type.

Number of Reflection and Choice Governments	
64	33%
Number of Accident and Force Governments	
129	67%
Total Number of Governments	
193	100%

Table 1: Number of governments developed from each formation type


As this table reveals, one-third of the 193 UN recognized governments developed from reflection and choice while the remaining two-thirds of those governments developed by accident and force. Shown visually, Figure 1 depicts a world map where the dark blue represents regime development via reflection and choice and the light blue accident and force.

Figure 1: Governments developed by each formation type



This breakdown alone prompts several additional questions that query “why is that so many more governments develop by accident and force rather than reflection and choice?” Some potential answers could be that it takes far more effort to develop a regime through reflection and choice. Another answer could be that regimes arising from reflection and choice typically follow at least one regime that arose from accident and force. As we discovered, more than half of the countries included in this study are less than forty-years-old and developed by accident and force, so they may not have had a chance to have a regime change via reflection and choice yet. Figure 2 depicts a histogram of country age.

Figure 2: Governments grouped by age



As this histogram shows there is a large right-tail skew to government age, revealing that there are many young countries and few older countries in the world. Interestingly, the United States has the oldest, significantly unchanged constitution in the world. While there are several European constitutions and governing documents that are technically older, those documents or traditions have all been significantly amended to alter the regime type, create new branches of government, or significantly shift the distribution of power between existing government entities.

Another key descriptor is how many different types of governments were represented in our sample. Table 2 contains the breakdown of government type. As the table reveals, a vast majority of regimes in existence are republics. Within republics, most of those are modeled after the United States' government or are pseudo-republics where the citizens of the country have less political power than in traditional republics.

Government Type	
Democracy	15
Dictatorship	2
Monarchy	28
Republic	141
Communist	4
Interim	1
Authoritarian	2
Total	193

Table 2: Number of each type of government

Moving into the inferential statistics, the investigation gets even more interesting. We ran several regressions to try to get a clear picture of the relationship between our main independent variable and the various dependent variables. To begin, we ran a few crude simple, linear regressions. The results of the crude regressions are summarized below in Table 3. The best regressions from our analysis are discussed separately.

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Adjusted R-Square	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-Value
Formation Type	Government Type	0.0356	-0.4078	0.1434	0.0049***
Formation Type	Economic Freedom	-0.005	6.8369	30.6417	0.8237
Formation Type	Freedom Ranking	0.0017	13.0001	11.3013	0.2514
Year Formed	Quality Score	-0.003	0.6952	1.0556	0.51
Formation Type	Quality Score w/o GDP	-0.0052	-5.0159	73.2425	0.9455
Formation Type	Quality Score w/GDP	0.0965	15935.4116	3435.2837	6.4932E-06***

Table 3: Crude, simple, linear regressions

As this table reveals, our initial regressions were fairly useless. The adjusted R-square values show that the independent variables are of little use in explaining any percent of the variability of the dependent variables about their means. Additionally, the significance of the relationships between formation type/economic freedom, formation type/freedom ranking, year formed/quality score, and formation type/quality score w/o GDP all lacked statistically significant relationships at a 95% confidence level. The other two relationships, formation type/government type and formation type/quality score w/GDP, had statistically significant relationships at the 95% confidence level. However, they also had large standard errors relative to the data considered in each relationship. That acknowledgment coupled with the abysmal adjusted R-square casts a lot of doubt on the usefulness of the p-value and the predictive power of the coefficient.

However, these were crude regressions that did not consider weights on the different metrics. When the metrics were grouped into our three categories which were weighted to represent 33% of the overall quality score, the linear regressions ran looked very different. Table 4 displays the weighted regression findings.


Independent Variable(s)	Dependent Variable	Adjusted R-Square	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-Value
Formation Type	Weighted Quality Score	0.1211	0.0834	0.0159	4.2311E-07***
Government Age	Weighted Quality Score	0.2655	0.0018	0.0002	1.0581E-14***
Formation Type, Government Age	Weighted Quality Score	0.3343	0.0641 0.0016	0.0141 0.0002	9.3129E-06*** 2.3759E-13***

Table 4: Final regression results

These regressions paint a slightly clearer picture than the previous regressions. Looking to the first relationship in the table, the adjusted R-Square reveals that knowing the independent variables can explain 12%, 27%, and 33% of the variability of the


dependent variable respectively. The reason we looked at adjusted R-square rather than just the regular R-square is to account for the covariance that exists between the two independent variables. The final set of coefficients reveal that a regime arising from reflection and choice is associated with a 6.41% increase in weighted quality score. Additionally, a one-year increase in government age is associated with a 0.16% increase in weighted quality score. All p-values were highly significant at the 95% confidence level. Because of this, we can say that there is a statistically significant relationship between our independent variables and dependent variable. To further explore the relationship we were most interested in, we visualized the dynamics between formation type and weighted quality score further in Figures 3 and 4.

Figure 3: Scatterplot of formation type and weighted quality score



This figure displays the line-of-best-fit for the relationship and includes the model equation where $\beta_0=0.3789$ and $\beta_1=0.0834$.

Figure 4: Weighted quality score by country



This map shows the distribution of weighted quality scores globally. As one might expect, North America, Europe, Australia, and parts of South America have the highest quality regimes.

The final regression ran in this study was a multivariate regression that included formation type, country age, six binary variables to identify each continent, and seven binary variables to specify government type as the explanatory variables and the weighted quality score as the dependent variable. This regression presents an even more detailed image of the relationships at the heart of this study. With this regression, the

adjusted R-square was 0.5140. This means that knowing the independent variables can explain 51% of the variability about the mean of the dependent variable. Additionally, the significance of the F-statistic was 2.069E-27, which strongly indicates that the variation between groups is not random. The results are summarized in Table 5.

Weighted Quality Score			
	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>P-value</i>
Intercept	0.1710	0.0602	0.0050***
Formation Type	0.0396	0.0128	0.0022***
Government Age (years)	0.0010	0.0002	0.0000***
N. America	0.0000	0.0000	---
Europe	0.0676	0.0270	---
Asia	-0.0352	0.0274	0.2010
Africa	-0.0248	0.0281	0.3782
S. America	0.0226	0.0304	0.4586
Oceania	0.0295	0.0320	0.3574
Democracy	0.2426	0.0600	0.0001***
Dictatorship	0.0000	0.0000	---
Monarchy	0.2055	0.0569	---
Republic	0.1778	0.0552	0.0015***
Communist	0.0498	0.0672	0.4597
Interim	0.0539	0.0948	0.5705
Authoritarian	0.0588	0.0769	0.4459

Table 5: Multivariate regression

As this table reveals, the formation type, government age, whether a country is a democracy, and whether a government is a republic have statistically significant p-values. Notably, both the coefficients for formation type and government age decreased with the added binary variables for continent and government type. This time, a regime arising from accident and force is only associated with a 3.96 percent increase in weighted quality score, while each additional year in age is associated with a 0.1% increase in weighted quality score. Additionally, only two coefficients were negative. If a regime develops in Asia or Africa, then that country's weighted quality score has an

associated decrease of 3.52% and 2.48% respectively. However, these coefficients were not statistically significant, so the relationship may not be a reality.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

There are several points of discussion that arise from this study. First, we found enough evidence to suggest that Hamilton's claim in Federalist #1 and our hypothesis are validated. Explicitly stated, governments that arise from reflection and choice are more likely provide a higher quality of life to its citizens than governments that arise from accident and force, according to our correlation model. While we succeeded in developing a regression equation that can provide some general predictions for a government's weighted quality score, it lacks enough predictive power to accurately and specifically determine the weighted quality score of a country in a useful way. This is partially due to the fact that there are likely other confounding variables not accounted for in this study. For example, it would be useful to know metrics like previous colonization, the identity of the colonizer, geography, disease, political culture, and other metrics not identified here. Ideally, the metrics from our study and the metrics from studies discussed in our literature review could be combined to develop a very specific model. Knowing additional variables could help to further identify what impacts the quality of a government.

Additionally, the regressions run in this study were all linear. It could be interesting to test what would happen under other function conditions and models, such including log-linear, log-log, or power models. Future iterations of this study might consider using other regression approaches to further test the strength of the discovered relationship.

Other statistical technique that could be used to further tease out the minutiae of this study would be the use of causal models in addition to correlation models. One of the biggest limitations of this study is that nothing we did statistically can support a causative statement. Additional tests and robustness checks would be needed for causative claims to be made.

Finally, our study also looked at global standards of good and bad. However, a future study could go through and identify the same quality metrics used in this study, but for the regime that preceded the current one. With this information, a dif-and-dif analysis could be used to put good and bad into terms that are country specific. It might be the case that a current government that scores low on the global scale could be a significant improvement from the previous government. It would be useful to know the change in quality between regimes within the same country. Then, in addition to being able to see active change, one could also figure out what pattern of formation type is most influential (i.e. going from “A+F to R+C,” “A+F to A+F,” “R+C to A+F,” or “R+C to R+C”).

Turning to think about the broader implications of this study, it is possible to see an immediate application of our findings to foreign policy. It is no secret that the United States and several European countries have taken part in regime wars and international interventions around the globe. As such, we are seeing, and will continue to see, the effect that regime formation via accident and force has on government outcome. When political bodies are considering whether or not to intervene in another country’s affairs, perhaps our study could be used to help lead key players and policy makers to a decision. The findings of our study would suggest that encouraging democratic

processes that fit the political culture of the country and refraining from forceful intervention could be the most strategic and successful actions to take.

Another use for this study would be at a domestic level. As a nation considers a change in regime type, perhaps the people within that country should ponder what the best method of implementing change is. If they want a regime that is more closely correlated with a high quality of life, then this study could be a guide.

However, despite the potential utilization of this study to impact government decisions, the most important takeaways stem from what our study failed to determine and how this investigation complements the findings of other studies. When reviewing all the research that has looked at factors of development, a noticeable pattern emerges. It would appear that the factors of development people can control (i.e. formation type, institutions, etc.), tend to have a weaker impact on the future success of a government and country than factors that lie outside human control (i.e. resource possession, colonization by another country, culture, etc.).

One interpretation of this is particularly grim. Looking at this pattern, it could be easy to say that the quality and outcomes of government are simply out of humankind's ability to control. Given that humans cannot will resources in and out of existence, nor strike memories of past events and cultures from the consciousness of a population, these unchangeable and indomitable factors will always have an effect on the state of a nation. For the governments in countries that happen to stumble upon the right combination of resources, culture, and history, this realization is not all that earth-shaking or worrisome. However, for governments located in countries that do not have the right balance between these uncontrollable factors, this message could be incredibly

hopeless. It may seem that, no matter how hard a nation tries to adopt what is believed to be good government practices, quality of life within that country will never improve.

Luckily, there is an alternative and more hopeful interpretation regarding the influence of ungovernable forces. Rather than the uncontrollable single-handedly determining the trajectory of a government, there may exist a reality where the controllable aspects of development can still be used to indirectly steer the other forces towards the desired destination. Conditions and outcomes may not be flawless, but there can still be improvement. This idea aligns perfectly with observations made by Alexis de Tocqueville in his famous *Democracy in America*. In the final chapter of his work, de Tocqueville states,

“The world which is arising is still half-buried in the ruins of the world falling into decay, and in the vast confusion of all human affairs at present, no one can know which of the old institutions and former mores will continue to hold up their heads and which will in the end go under...The nations of our day cannot prevent conditions of equality from spreading in their midst. But it depends upon themselves whether equality is to lead to servitude or freedom, knowledge or barbarism, prosperity or wretchedness.”

In this passage, de Tocqueville simultaneously acknowledges that there is much about the world that is unknown and uncontrollable. However, he asserts that it is up to people and governments to decide how to react to inevitabilities. It is a combination of intentional decisions and happenstance that determines regime success or failure.

This interpretation is one that provides some hope and comfort. Although deliberate actions and choices may not be the most important factor in establishing a good government and thus fostering a high quality of life, there are aspects of the

development process that can be controlled and used to minimize the bad and the wrong. Development studies are incredibly complex, so it seems fitting that no single factor can explain, in a simple manner, how to start a government.

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Appendix 1 – Definitions:

- Institutions: The formal and informal offices, departments, and rules that govern human behavior¹
- Economic Freedom: The fundamental right of every human to control their own labor and property²
- Quality of Life: An individual's perception of their position in life in the context of the culture and value systems in which they live and in relation to their goals, expectations, standards and concerns³
- Government: The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is Exercised, including (1) the process by which governments, are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them⁴
- Government Development: An emergent property of the economic and social system⁵

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² <https://www.heritage.org/index/about>

³ <https://www.who.int/healthinfo/survey/whoqol-qualityoflife/en/>

⁴ <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/665731468739470954/pdf/multi-page.pdf>

⁵ <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/what-development>

Appendix 2 – Codebook

Development Type (Reflection and Choice)

Development Type	Code
Accident and Force	0
Reflection and Choice	1

Government Type

Government Type	Code
Democracy	1
Dictatorship	2
Monarchy	3
Republic	4
Communist	5
Interim	6
Authoritarian	7

Continent

Continent	Code
N. America	1
Europe	2
Asia	3
Africa	4
S. America	5
Oceania	6
Antarctica	7

Number of Political Parties

Number of Primary Political Parties	Code
None	0
1	1
2	2
≥3	3